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Abstract
This article deals with classes of antagonistic games with two players.
A game is specified in terms of two “hostile” stochastic processes repre-
senting mutual attacks upon random times exerting casualties of random
magnitudes. The game ends when one of the players is defeated. We tar-
get the first passage time τρ of the defeat and the amount of casualties to
either player upon τρ. Here we validate our claim of analytic tractability
of the general formulas obtained in [1] under various transforms.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we model purely antagonistic stochastic games of two players, A
and B, who periodically attack each other according to two independent marked
random measures
A :=
∑
j≥1
wjεsj , and B :=
∑
k≥1
zkεtk , (1.1)
where s1 > 0, t1 > 0.
The game evolves as a mutual conflict involving two players A and B hit-
ting each other at random until one of the players is “exhausted.” In short,
the players attack each other in accordance with two independent marked point
processes A and B of (1.1) on a probability space (Ω,F , P ), where εa is the
1
Dirac point mass at point a ∈ R,
∑
j≥1 εsj and
∑
k≥1 εtk are underlying point
random measures representing the times of attacks, and the marks {wj} and
{zk} (nonnegative random variables) represent respective amounts of damage
dealt to players A and B. Players A and B can sustain the attacks until their
respective cumulative casualties cross thresholds M and N (positive real num-
bers). At a time when it takes place (called the first passage time), i.e. when
one of the players loses the game, the game should formally stop.
However, the game is observed upon random epochs of time T = {τ1, τ2, . . .}
and the outcome of the game is not known in real time. The first passage time
is then shifted to an epoch τρ, i.e. upon one of the observation instants of time.
Thus, the narrative of the game is delayed allowing the players to continue
fighting each other beyond their assumed merits of endurance, thereby letting
the game to follow the path of a more realistic scenario.
In the sequel, we make assumptions on A, B, as being Poisson marked pro-
cesses and T being a Poisson point process. If Xi and Yi are casualties to players
A and B over the interval (τi−1, τi], and observed upon τi, then
Ak = X0 +X1 + · · ·+Xk, Bk = Y0 + Y1 + . . .+ Yk (1.2)
are the cumulative damages to players A and B by time τk. With the exit
indices
ν1 := inf{j ≥ 0 : Aj = X0 +X1 + · · ·+Xj ≥M}, (1.3)
ν2 := inf{k ≥ 0 : Bk = Y0 + Y1 + · · ·+ Yk ≥ N}, (1.4)
ρ := min {ν1, ν2} , (1.5)
the random time τρ is the observed first passage time or the observed ruin time
or the observed exit time from the game. We recall that the real ruin time is
unknown and it takes place anywhere between τρ−1 (observed pre-exit time)
and τρ. Obviously, the finer are the observation times, the shorter is a delay of
the end of the game. The other information of interest are Aρ and Bρ being
the total damages to players A and B upon the ruin time. Clearly, Aρ ≥M or
Bρ ≥ N, whereas Aρ−1 < M and Bρ−1 ≤ N .
In this paper we seek the joint transforms
Φ (u, v, θ) = EuAρvBρe−θτρ, ‖u‖ ≤ 1, ‖v‖ ≤ 1,Re θ ≥ 0 (1.6)
or
Φ (u, v, θ) = E
[
e−uAρvBρe−θτρ
]
, Re u ≥ 0, ‖v‖ ≤ 1,Re θ ≥ 0 (1.7)
The first transform is suited for discrete-valued components due to integer-
valued marks {wj} and {zk}, whereas the second transform accounts to the
mixed case to be discussed next.
A method of finding Φ was suggested by Agarwal and Dshalalow [1] in which
the authors treated a multivariate marked point process with mutually depen-
dent marks of which exactly two were so-called active. The latter means that
2
the cumulative marks identified as active are to cross thresholds (such as M
and N previously introduced) which bring the entire process to a hold upon
crossing at the first passage time, whereas the rest of the marks identified as
passive just assumes their respective values. One of them is the first passage
time τρ. Although functional Φ is a special case of a more general functional
in [1] (that was not related to a game), we want to demonstrate the actual use
of some discrete operators proposed in [1] and not only that. We also want to
show that the mathematical outcome of the game is analytically tractable and
numerically tame.
The following result is due to [1] in its special and a largely abridged form.
Theorem 1 (Agarwal and Dshalalow [1]). Under the assumptions (1.1)-(1.6),
the functional Φ of the process can be expressed through
γ (u, v, θ) = E
[
uX1vY1e−θτ1
]
(1.8)
and it satisfies the following formula
Φ (u, v, θ) = E
[
uAρvBρe−θτρ
]
= 1− [1− γ(u, v, θ)]DM−1, N−1xy
{
1
1− γ(ux, vy, θ)
}
(1.9)
where the operator D (applied to a function ϕ : C3 → C analytic at (x, y) =
(0, 0)) defined as
Dk,mx,y ϕ (x, y, z) =
{
lim
x→0,y→0
1
k!m!
∂k+m
∂xk∂ym
[
ϕ(x,y,z)
(1−x)(1−y)
]
, k,m ≥ 0
0, k < otherwise
(1.10)
2 Motivation
The class of antagonistic games which we study occur almost in every sphere of
life. The following are some examples of games pertinent to our models.
Cancer Treatment. Some cancers are curable while others are not. Most
metastatic cancer (which spreads from a primary site to other parts of the body
over lymph nodes and blood vessels) are incurable but can be managed to some
extent using radiation alone or with other forms of treatment like chemotherapy.
In relation to the antagonistic games, an oncologist, along with his/her treat-
ment, can be regarded as player A while the tumor - as player B. The oncologist
attacks the tumor cells with radiation and/or chemotherapy. While the tumor
can shrink under the treatment, it may also continue spreading to other parts
of the body (metastasize). Notice that any treatment by itself always has side
effects (such as weakening immune system) that can be regarded as a collateral
damage. At some point, when the cancer continues to spread and thus the body
does not respond to the treatment, unless there are alternative options, player A
is defeated. On the other hand, if the body well responds to the treatment and
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the tumor vanishes (the state of remission), we declare that player B is defeated.
In a more modest form of a defeat, the tumor can shrink or significantly shrink
instead of disappearing entirely.
Note that cancer cells like bacteria cells typically divide in two progeny and
they initially evolve as a deterministic branching process. However, some cancer
cells are eliminated by T-killer cells, and at some point, when cancer matures,
it evolves not from a single but many cells. If we also take into consideration
mutations exhibiting an increase of the number of chromosomes (beginning in
46 to 64 and further), on an early stage, the general tumor development be-
comes rather chaotic allowing us to model it by an independent and stationary
increment process.
Since in this paper the “nature” of attacks goes to integer-valued increments,
and since we work on entirely discrete operational calculus, we would like to
emphasize why some applications can contain entirely discrete components (or
at worst they can be approximated by units made arbitrarily small).
Global Military Warfare. This is a situation where a country or group of
countries are at war with one another under military operations. One classical
example is the war between the United States and Japan during the WWII which
consisted of multiple phases [8]. Phase 1 began with economic sanctions imposed
on Japan by the US in 1940-1941 due to Japan’s aggression in Manchuria. Japan
tried to negotiate with the US (apparently until November 26 of 1941), but the
concessions offered by the Japanese were not satisfactory to the US, and Japan
not wishing to give in had no other choice as to strike on December 7, 1941.
This corresponds to the beginning of phase 2. Undoubtedly, Japan was not
ruined economically, but it was significantly crippled (being deprived of steel
and oil, to name a few). At the same time Japan did not want to stop her
campaign in China, which the US chose not to tolerate, also fearing Japan’s
further expansion. The Japanese Pearl Harbor attack followed by their Pacific
campaign is yet another intermediate phase prior to a full scale war, because
Japan believed the US will be deterred from further actions under the inflicted
casualties and loss of territories in the Pacific.
Global Economic Warfare. A recent economic confrontation between
the US/Europe and Russia is an antagonistic game. Here player A will be
the US/Europe while player B is Russia. US and Europe stroke Russia with
numerous sanctions in an attempt to weaken its economy and to drive Russia
out of Ukraine, while Russia reciprocated with their own sanctions (such as
forbidding US and Canada officials from entering Russia and adopting a ban on
fruit, vegetables, fish, meat, and dairy products from the US and Europe) to
counter such attacks.
Corporate Economic Hostilities. Here we refer to a hostile relationship
between two or more corporations which have a similar goal or offer similar
services. In particular, we consider ride sharing companies (examples include
Uber and Lyft) and taxi cabs (such as the Yellow Cab which is a sole licensed
taxi cab company in Long Beach city). Uber in recent times have had to reduce
their fares for their riders and this has brought about a drift of riders from Yellow
Cab to Uber while they also make use of recent and flashy cars to attract its
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riders and make them feel more comfortable compared to Yellow Cab. This
move by Uber is some form of attack on Yellow Cab which seems to be working
as Uber gains more riders defecting from Yellow Cab riders. In turn, Yellow Cab
attacks Uber now by calling on the authorities to make ride sharing companies
face the same regulatory burdens as they do. While at the same time they
are working with city councils to remove taxi’s fare floor, discount fares as
condition warrants, provide an ordering applications as well as getting a new
branding identity.
Existing Literature. The idea of utilizing multivariate random walk pro-
cesses in stochastic games goes back to Agarwal and Dshalalow [1] and vari-
ous earlier work of Dshalalow (see a related bibliography therein). Variants of
stochastic games were studied in papers [8, 9, 10, 11] by the first author and
his collaborators, among them - games with coalitions [10]. There were several
efforts to apply formulas in [1], such as Theorem 1 and alike, with different
degree of success. One of them was Dshalalow and Treerattrakoon [11] with
continuous operational calculus. Unlike traditional methods in operational cal-
culus and special functions, in this paper we open a new avenue of discrete
operational calculus utilizing discrete inverse formulas for a class of bivariate
operators D introduced in (1.10) which we explore in section 3. Such tools are
non-existent in the literature except for a few scattered results in articles by
the first author and his collaborators. We manage to obtain a fully tractable
formula for the joint functional Φ of three dependent components of the game,
the first observed passage time τρ and cumulative casualties of the players. We
also obtain explicitly the marginal probability density function of τρ.
The subject of our modeling is entirely focused on fully antagonistic games
which are popular in game theory. They cover a range of applications in eco-
nomics [4, 5, 6, 12, 14, 15, 19], warfare [3, 5, 13, 18, 20], and biology [16] to
name a few. The methodology we use is based on fluctuation theory of stochastic
processes as in, e.g. [1, 2, 17].
3 A Special Case with Discrete Components
Notice that in most applications, the functional γ (u, v, θ) = E
[
uX1vY1e−θτ1
]
can be readily found, as it is in our case. Let us assume that the mutual attacks
on players A and B follow in accordance with two independent ordinary Poisson
processes A and B specified in (1.1) of intensities λ and µ.
Since A and B are ordinary, the respective marks wj ’s and zk’s are 1 a.s.
Furthermore, the observations take place at times τ1, τ2, . . . that forms a renewal
process, with inter-renewal times ∆1 = τ1,∆2 = τ2 − τ1, . . . ∈ [∆] , i.e., being
identically distributed with the common Laplace-Stieltjes transform
γ (θ) = E
[
e−θ∆
]
. (3.1)
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In this case, since X and Y are conditionally independent given ∆,
γ (u, v, θ) = EuX1vY1e−θτ1 = E
[
E
[
uX1vY1e−θτ1∆
]]
= E
[
e−θ∆E
[
uX1∆
]
E
[
vY1∆
]]
= E
[
e−θ∆eλ∆(u−1)eµ∆(v−1)
]
= γ [θ + λ− λu + µ− µv] (3.2)
In the special case when ∆ ∈ [Exp (γ)] (exponentially distributed with pa-
rameter γ), from (3.2) we have
γ (u, v, θ) =
γ
γ + λ(1 − u) + µ(1 − v) + θ
(3.3)
and thus
1
1− γ(u, v, θ)
= 1 +
γ
λ(1 − u) + µ(1 − v) + θ
. (3.4)
Now we are going to use the following properties of the D-operator [2, 7].
Theorem 2 (Dshalalow [7]). The following properties hold true of the D-
operator introduced in (1.10).
(i) Dk,mx,y = D
k
x ◦ D
m
y = D
m
y ◦ D
k
x
(ii) D is a linear functional with Dx {1 (x)} = 1, where 1 (x) = 1 for all x ∈ R.
(iii) Dkx
{
xjg(x)
}
= Dk−jx {g(x)}.
(iv) For any real number b it holds true that
Dkx
{
1
1−bx
}
=
{
1−bk+1
1−b , b 6= 1
k + 1, b = 1
(v) For any real number a and for a positive integer n,
Dkx
{
1
(1− ax)
n
}
=
{∑k
j=0
(
n+j−1
j
)
aj , (a, n) 6= (1, 1)
k + 1, (a, n) = (1, 1)
(vi) For two real numbers a and b it holds
Dkx
{
1
1− bx
1
(1− ax)
n
}
=
{
1
1−b
∑k
j=0
(
n+j−1
j
)(
aj − bk+1
(
a
b
)j)
, b 6= 1∑k
j=0
(
n+j−1
j
)
aj (k − j + 1) , b = 1
Theorem 3. For the special case of a discrete antagonistic game of two players,
the joint functional Φ satisfies the following formulas:
Φ(u, v, θ) =
γ
γ + λ (1− u) + µ (1− v) + θ
×
(
1−
λ (1− u) + µ (1− v) + θ
λ+ µ (1− v) + θ
ψ
)
(3.5)
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where
ψ =
1− bM
1− b
−
1
1− b
CN
M−1∑
j=0
(
N + j − 1
j
)[
aj − bM
(a
b
)j ]
(3.6)
a =
λu
λ+ µ+ θ
, b =
λu
λ+ µ+ θ − µv
, C =
µv
λ+ µ+ θ
(3.7)
Proof. From Theorem 2(i),
DM−1, N−1xy
{
1
1− γ(ux, vy, θ)
}
= DM−1x
{
DN−1y
{
1
1− γ(ux, vy, θ)
}}
.
Let p = λ+ µ+ θ then from (3.3) and Theorem 2 (ii) and (iv),
DN−1y
{
1
1− γ(ux, vy, θ)
}
= DN−1y
{
1 +
γ
p − λux
1
1− µv
p−λux
.y
}
= 1 +
γ
p − λux
· DN−1y
{
1
1− µv
p−λux
· y
}
= 1 +
γ
p− λux
1−
(
µv
p−λux
)N
1− µv
p−λux
= 1 + γ ·
1−
[
µv
p−λux
]N
p− µv − λux
= 1 +
γ
p− µv
1
1− λu
p−µv
x

1−
(
µv
p
1
1− λu
p
x
)N
After some simple algebraic manipulation,
DN−1y
{
1
1− γ(ux, vy, θ)
}
= 1 +
γ
p− µv
[
1
1− bx
−
1
1− bx
CN
1
(1− ax)N
]
Then
DM−1, N−1xy
{
1
1− γ(ux, vy, θ)
}
= DM−1x
{
1 +
γ
p− µv
[
1
1− bx
− CN
1
1− bx
1
(1− ax)N
]}
From (iv), and (vi) with b 6= 1 as in case 1 of Theorem 2 (vi),
DM−1, N−1xy
{
1
1− γ(ux, vy, θ)
}
= 1 +
γ
p− µv

1− bM
1− b
−
1
1− b
CN
M−1∑
j=0
(
N + j − 1
j
)[
aj − bM
(a
b
)j]
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By (1.9),
Φ (u, v, θ) = 1− [1− γ(u, v, θ)]DM−1, N−1xy
{
1
1− γ(ux, vy, θ)
}
= 1− [1− γ(u, v, θ) ]
×
{
1 +
γ
p− µv
[
1− bM
1− b
−
1
1− b
CN
M−1∑
j=0
(
N + j − 1
j
)[
aj − bM
(a
b
)j ]]}
.
After some algebra and replacing p with λ+µ+θ and using notation (3.6)-(3.7),
we find the required result,
Φ (u, v, θ) =
γ
γ + λ(1− u) + µ(1− v) + θ
×
(
1−
λ(1− u) + µ(1− v) + θ
λ+ µ(1− v) + θ
ψ
)
.
Example 1 (The Marginal Transform of τρ). Letting u = v = 1 in Φ (u, v, θ)
of Theorem 3,
E
[
e−θτρ
]
=
γ
γ + θ
{(
λ
λ+ θ
)M
+
(
µ
λ+ µ+ θ
)N}
where
F =
M−1∑
j=0
(
N + j − 1
j
)(
λ
λ+ µ+ θ
)j [
1−
(
λ
λ+ θ
)M−j]
Example 2 (The Marginal Transform of Aρ). Letting v = 1 and θ = 0 in
Φ (u, v, θ) of Theorem 3,
E
[
uAρ
]
=
γ
γ + λ (1− u)
[
uM +
(
µ
µ+ λ
)N
G
]
where
G =
M−1∑
j=0
(
N + j − 1
j
)(
λu
λ+ µ
)j (
1− uM−j
)
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Example 3 (The Marginal Transform of Bρ). Letting u = 1 and θ = 0 in
Φ (u, v, θ) of Theorem 3,
E
[
vBρ
]
=
γ
γ + µ (1− v)
[
bM +
(
µv
λ+ µ
)N
H
]
,
where
H =
M−1∑
j=0
(
N + j − 1
j
)(
λ
λ+ µ
)j (
1− bM−j
)
and b = λ
λ+µ(1−v)
To find the probability density function of τρ we make use of the following
inverse Laplace transform formulas which can be readily proved.
Lemma 4. Let α, γ, λ be some real fixed numbers. Then,
L−1θ
(
1
γ + θ
1
(λ+ θ)
n
)
(t) =
e−γt
(λ− γ)
nP (n− 1, (λ− γ) t)
where
P (n, αt) = 1−
Γ (n, αt)
Γ (n)
= 1− e−αt
n∑
j=0
(αt)j
j!
is the regularized gamma function.
Proof.
L−1θ
(
1
γ + θ
1
(λ+ θ)
n
)
(t) = e−γt
1
(λ− γ)
n
[
1− e(γ−λ)t
n−1∑
i=0
(λ− γ)
i
i!
ti
]
=
e−γt
(λ− γ)
nP (n− 1, (λ− γ) t) .
Lemma 5. Let α, γ, λ be some real fixed numbers. Then,
L−1θ
(
1
γ + θ
1
(λ+ θ)m
1
(α+ θ)n
)
(t)
= e−γt (−1)n
m−1∑
k=0
(
n− k − 1
k
)
1
(λ− α)n+k
×
{
1
(λ− γ)
m−k
P (m− k + 1, (λ− γ) t)
−
1
(λ− α)m−k
n+k−1∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
m+ i− k − 1
i
)
P (m+ i− k − 1, (λ− α) t)
}
.
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Proof. By well-known formulas for inverse Laplace transforms,
L−1θ
(
1
γ + θ
1
(λ+ θ)
m
1
(α+ θ)
n
)
(t)
= g (α, λ)
{
1
(λ− γ)
m−k
[
e−γt − e−λt
m−k−1∑
r=0
(λ− γ)
r
r!
tr
]
−
n+k−1∑
i=0
(α− λ)
i
[(
m+ i− k − 1
i
)
1
(λ− α)
m+i−k
×
(
e−γt − e(α−λ−γ)t
m+i−k−1∑
s=0
(λ− α)
s
s!
ts
)]}
where
g (α, λ) =
1
(n− 1)! (α− λ)
n
m−1∑
k=0
(n+ k − 1)!
k!
1
(λ− α)
k
= (−1)
n
m−1∑
k=0
(
n− k − 1
k
)
1
(λ− α)
n+k
.
Next, we see this is equivalent to
e−γtg (α, λ)
{
1
(λ− γ)
m−k
[
1− e−(λ−γ)t
m−k−1∑
r=0
(λ− γ)
r
r!
tr
]
−
1
(λ− α)
m−k
n+k−1∑
i=0
(−1)
i
(
m+ i− k − 1
i
)
×
(
1− e−(λ−α)t
m+i−k−1∑
s=0
(λ− α)
s
s!
ts
)}
= e−γt (−1)
n
m−1∑
k=0
(
n− k − 1
k
)
1
(λ− α)
n+k
×
{
1
(λ− γ)m−k
P (m− k + 1, (λ− γ) t)
−
1
(λ− α)
m−k
n+k−1∑
i=0
(−1)
i
(
m+ i− k − 1
i
)
× P (m+ i− k − 1, (λ− α) t)
}
Example 4 (The Probability Density Function of τρ). Revisiting Example 1
we go further to obtain the probability density function of the first observed
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passage time of the game end. Since Ee−θτρ is the Laplace-Stieltjes transform,
we need to divide it by θ and then take the Laplace inverse to obtain the density
function, fτρ ,
fτρ(t) = L
−1
θ
{
E
[
e−θτρ
]}
(t)
= L−1θ
{
γλM
(γ + θ)(λ + θ)M
+
M−1∑
j=0
(
N + j − 1
j
)
γλjµN
(γ + θ)(λ+ µ+ θ)N+j
−
M−1∑
j=0
(
N + j − 1
j
)
γλMµN
(γ + θ)(λ+ θ)M−j(λ+ µ+ θ)N+j
}
(t) .
By Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 and after some algebra, we have
fτρ(t) =
γλMe−γt
(λ− γ)
M
P (M − 1, λ− γ)
+ γµNe−γt
M−1∑
j=0
(
N + j − 1
j
)
λj
(λ+ µ− γ)
N+j
P (N + j − 1, λ+ µ− γ)
− γµNe−γt
M−1∑
j=0
(
N + j − 1
j
)
λM−N−j
M−j−1∑
k=0
(
N + j − k − 1
k
)
(−1)
k
λk
×
{
1
(λ− γ)
M−j−k
P (M − j − k + 1, (λ− γ) t)−
(−1)
M−j−k
µM−j−k
×
N+j+k−1∑
l=0
(−1)l
(
M − j + l− k − 1
l
)
P (M − j + l − k − 1,−µt)
}
.
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